War
Dames
By Phillip Carter
In
the event of an armed conflict with Iraq, more American
women than ever before will be at or near the front lines
Last
February, as the sun rose over a parched California desert,
tanks from the 4th Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade reached
a large enemy minefield. Their orders were to secure a hilltop
in the enemy’s rear area. But until combat engineers could
clear a path, the tanks would be sitting ducks for nearby
tank and artillery fire. And without cover, the engineers
would likewise be pinned down.
At
the prearranged moment, a column of armored smoke vehicles
commanded by Capt. Streigel of the 46th Chemical Company
threaded its way cautiously forward, laying down a thick
haze to mask the engineer teams. In less than an hour, the
engineers had opened a gap, and 1st Brigade moved through
to its objective, thanks to the precision teamwork under
fire of Streigel’s soldiers and the other ground units.
Like most battles at the National Training Center, this
one was hard—the closest approximation to combat that the
Army can create in peacetime and a rigorous test for the
military’s newest tactics and equipment. As war looms with
Iraq, these training exercises, along with others taking
place in the Louisiana swamps and on the German plains,
assess combat skills before the real bullets start to fly.
The California exercise in particular was a good indicator
of how American soldiers will fight a war against Iraq—and
also how much has changed since the Gulf War. Over the last
decade, the Army has digitized its equipment, upgraded its
tanks, and added capabilities like peacekeeping to its mission,
all part of a sustained, high-profile effort to adapt to
war in the 21st century.
But one quieter transformation was also on display in the
desert: Capt. Streigel is a woman. Ten years ago, Jennifer
Streigel never could have commanded a front-line chemical
company in the U.S. Army. But the next time the United States
goes into battle, women will be as close to the front lines
as any infantryman. During its minefield operation, Streigel’s
company fought shoulder to shoulder with the combat engineers
and deployed more armored vehicles than a tank company—and
four of its five officers were women. In fact, Streigel
is just one of thousands of women who, since the Gulf War,
have been steadily migrating to assignments that place them
at or near the line of battle.
Since
the Gulf victory in 1991, a series of largely unnoticed
policy changes have opened new opportunities for women to
fight alongside, and even to lead, front-line troops. The
Navy and Air Force, with some fanfare, allowed women into
the cockpits of fighters and bombers. But less well-known
is how vastly the Army has expanded the role of women in
ground-combat operations. Today, women command combat military
police companies, fly Apache helicopters, work as tactical
intelligence analysts, and even serve in certain artillery
units—jobs that would have been unthinkable for them a decade
ago. In any war in Iraq, these changes could put thousands
of women in the midst of battle, far more than at any time
in American history.
This new role for female U.S. troops is the product of three
different forces. One is congressional pressure to integrate
the military by gender as it previously had been integrated
by race. Another is the ongoing enlistment shortage; the
military remains reluctant to admit women, yet is unable
to recruit enough competent men to staff an all-volunteer
Army. But the most important reason has been pressure from
women within the Army who need combat experience to advance
their careers, nearly all of them in the officer corps.
And yet this experiment has been conducted largely below
the threshold of public awareness.
The wisdom of this integration is sure to be tested in any
sizable ground war with Iraq. If female soldiers perform
poorly, they could put their comrades’ lives at risk, strengthen
the hand of conservatives who oppose women serving as soldiers,
and provoke a backlash from the American public. But if,
in the heat of battle, women fight bravely and effectively,
it could spark a different sort of debate among the military
and the public at large over why regulations and military
culture still conspire to keep women from many prime assignments
in the nation’s service.
The history of American women’s role in combat is a brief
one. Before the Vietnam War, only a small number of women
served in uniform, primarily in medical specialties and
occasionally as rear-echelon intelligence officers or as
pilots of transport aircraft. That began to change in the
mid-1970s with the advent of the all-volunteer army. No
longer able to rely on a steady stream of draftees, Army
recruiting experts expanded the number of specialties open
to women.
The first women entered West Point in 1976. Upon graduation,
they were allowed to pursue most career fields, but by law
were precluded from those “combat arms” specialties that
would place them on the front lines. This was done for two
explicit reasons. The first is the importance the military
places on “unit cohesion.” Integrated units, some theorists
have argued, would destroy the teamwork crucial to combat
performance. Male soldiers would become distracted and compete
for women’s attention, and would grow demoralized if women
were killed or wounded.
“No
unit can afford to have two people in love with another,”
says Dr. Anna Simons, a professor at the Navy’s Postgraduate
School who has written extensively on Special Forces and
believes that gender integration would have a disastrous
effect. “Forget the sex—this is about the clouding of judgment.
No matter how close the friendship is between men, it still
doesn’t jeopardize their decisions the way that love does.”
The second, more empirical reason is the physical disparity
between male and female soldiers. Put simply, many military
jobs require high levels of strength that most women just
don’t have. “You can’t just let women into [infantry units],”
argues Elaine Donnelly, a former member of the Defense Advisory
Committee on Women in the Services who now chairs the Center
for Military Readiness, a conservative group that opposes
women in combat. “Lowering the standard like that for the
infantry would be fatal.”
Thus, in the 1970s, the Army employed a “risk rule” to determine
whether a job would be open to women—literally measuring
how close to battle any given assignment might require a
soldier to be and barring women from those in which the
likelihood was high. This kept women from a wide swath of
assignments, and restricted opportunities even within fields
they could legally enter, like the military police or intelligence,
since almost every type of unit in the Army (even support
units) could theoretically see combat. As a result, women
could be assigned only to headquarters or other rear-echelon
units at overwhelmingly low combat risk.
But the American invasion of Panama in 1989 exposed the
risk rule as largely ineffective. In several widely reported
instances, female soldiers participated in firefights with
Panamanian Defense Forces or local militia. Support units
that included women took fire and returned it under conditions
that any veteran would describe as “combat.” When rear areas
become combat zones, every soldier is expected to grab a
rifle. Women wound up fighting under conditions that would
have earned them the Combat Infantryman’s Badge had they
been men and assigned to an infantry unit. Female convoy
drivers were ambushed, and returned fire. Female helicopter
pilots flew into battle zones, landed American infantry,
and picked up casualties under heavy ground fire. Women
assigned to military police units conducted infantry-style
missions to cordon off and search Panamanian neighborhoods
for enemy guerrillas—the same type of street fighting that
could take place in Baghdad.
The Gulf War, too, featured an innovation in American military
strategy that pushed the risk rule toward obsolescence:
“maneuver warfare.” This doctrine dictated that support
units should push as far forward as possible to provide
greater logistical aid to units in combat. The Army used
this strategy with stunning success against the Iraqis.
Since many U.S. support units were of mixed gender, women
wound up serving farther forward in the Gulf War than ever
before.
Some criticized women’s performance in Iraq, pointing to
ships and ground units with high pregnancy rates—even organized
prostitution rings—as examples of women’s harmful effect
on unit cohesion and morale. There have also been charges
of standards being lowered to let women into combat positions,
such as at least one high-visibility aviation accident with
a female pilot in 1994 who, critics charged, had been rushed
into the cockpit to ensure that a politically motivated
proportion of women earned their wings. But there were too
few female pilots at the time for any meaningful studies
to be conducted, and more recent reports from the air campaigns
in Kosovo and Afghanistan indicate that women pilots performed
as well as men, and, in some cases, even better.
Indeed, during the Gulf War, critics’ worst predictions
proved unfounded: Women did not flee combat in disproportionate
numbers, nor did their units collapse under the stresses
generated by their presence. The military consensus is that
most women performed well. And various studies of mixed-gender
units have shown that cohesion was not a problem—both in
exercises at the National Training Center and in actual
combat. (The critical variable in unit cohesion proved to
be not gender, but such differentials as the unit leader’s
time in command and the length of time the troops had spent
together.)
The presence of female troops did create something of a
bureaucratic nightmare. Before units could leave for the
Gulf, hundreds of women had to be transferred out for administrative
reasons. Some were pregnant and thus ineligible for combat
deployment. But many others were transferred out because
their commanders were unsure whether the risk rule permitted
them to be taken into combat. Likewise, many women had problems
arranging for child care during their deployments, especially
in families where both parents served. In most such situations,
commanders ordered the men to war and found ways to transfer
or discharge the women. But all these problems revealed
more about the ambiguity of the risk rule—and the military’s
ability to accommodate soldiers with children—than it did
about women’s fitness for combat.
While the Panama and Gulf engagements put female soldiers
to the test, other pressures were building. Many female
officers who had joined the service in the 1970s were complaining
by the 1980s that the long roster of restrictions was limiting
the range of command posts they could be assigned to. Because
getting ever bigger and better command assignments is the
key to military promotion, they rightly felt their careers
were being unfairly stymied. “Women can make sergeant major
with a lot of hard work and no combat experience; they can’t
make general as easily,” observes Charles Moskos, a sociologist
at Northwestern University who has studied the military
for 30 years. As a result, it’s largely female officers
who have pushed the liberalizing of women’s combat roles.
In response to the Gulf War, the Defense Department Advisory
Committee on Women in the Services moved to open up a wide
range of military occupations to women. When Bill Clinton
became president, the committee’s more activist members
and their allies in the military found a kindred spirit
in the White House. Suddenly, high-level Pentagon officials
were more receptive to recommendations for opening combat
roles to women. Key members of Congress, who had watched
women perform well in the Gulf, were also more supportive.
Through their efforts, Congress repealed the combat exclusion
laws in 1992. Two years later, Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin revised the risk rule in favor of a “Direct Combat
Probability Code” (“DCPC” in Pentagon-speak) that measured
risk more narrowly—by unit, not by geography—and created
thousands of new opportunities for women by allowing them
into all positions but those most likely to see ground combat:
the “trigger-puller” front-line formations such as infantry,
armor, artillery, and Special Forces.
As it happened, the trigger-pullers saw most of the action
in Afghanistan. But if the United States invades Iraq, women
will play a far wider role than ever before in any ground
offensive. Female chemical officers will lead the way through
contaminated areas; female engineer officers will help direct
any efforts to bridge the Euphrates; female helicopter pilots
will shuttle the infantry into and out of combat areas during
any assault.
Army policy still forbids women from being assigned to combat
units at the battalion level and below. (A battalion contains
300 to 500 soldiers and is likely to be very far forward.)
But women can serve in infantry, armor, artillery, and other
units at the brigade level and higher—the units directly
behind combat battalions on the battlefield—as well as support
units like military police and aviation that often work
alongside combat units. Recent changes in Army practices
and policies include, for example, formally assigning female
lieutenants to mixed-gender brigade headquarters while informally
attaching them to all-male combat battalions, as the Army
does at Ft. Hood, Texas. Why? Because the shortage of male
lieutenants is particularly acute in specialties like chemical
warfare and intelligence. Since 1995, the Army has also
experimented with a new organizational design for its combat
units, transferring many support positions from all-male
combat units to mixed-gender support units. Consequently,
large numbers of fuelers, medics, and mechanics who now
support the fighting arms are women—a change now spreading
through the rest of the Army, including the reserves, that
will potentially shift thousands of women farther forward
on the battlefield than ever before.
So why hasn’t anyone noticed women’s new roles in combat?
One reason has been reluctance among uniformed officers
to criticize policies related to race or gender for fear
of imperiling their careers by appearing politically incorrect.
But more positively, the Army has had relative success in
making the shift, leaving journalists with little bad news
or controversy to report. (And many female soldiers would
rather the press ignore their gender and treat them like
any other soldier.) The Army, moreover, has greatly improved
its handling of gender issues, especially since Bosnia and
Kosovo. One example is a reduction in the kind of family
support problems that plagued the Gulf War deployments.
“It used to be that the deployment child-care plans of many
men and women were convenient fictions—the Army ensures
that they’re much better now,” says Dr. Laura Miller, an
expert on military culture and gender issues at the RAND
Corporation.
The biggest reason why women in combat haven’t received
more scrutiny, though, is that America has not fought a
major ground war since the Gulf, or incurred major casualties
since Vietnam. But if the United States launches a ground
war against Iraq, hundreds or even thousands of female soldiers
are likely to see combat in a variety of ways. One is street
fighting, which often degenerates, as it did in Panama,
into house-to-house struggles without battle lines or safe
areas. Any action in, say, Baghdad or Basra could escalate
into the kind of mayhem not seen since the Tet Offensive
in Vietnam, where U.S. Marines fought for weeks to retake
the bitterly held city of Hue. In their roles as truck drivers,
MPs, signal specialists, and aviators, women would fight
alongside men in the cities of Iraq. If there is one area
likely to inflict significant casualties, upon men and women
alike, this will be it.
Then there’s the Euphrates. Any effort to cross the river
would necessarily include bridging, chemical units, and
military police units, all of which include female officers
and soldiers. In river-crossing operations, those “support
units” actually lead most of the action, with infantry and
armored units supporting them. Female engineers would actually
drive the boats and build the bridge to get our forces across
the river. Similarly, female combat-support soldiers would
be critical to any effort to breach Iraqi defenses. Female
helicopter pilots may undertake reconnaissance ahead of
any American infantry, or deposit troops to scout out strongpoints
on the ground. Chemical-warfare specialists like Capt. Striegel
would accompany engineer units as they opened paths through
Iraqi defensive positions.
And since women now serve in every major battalion-level
command post—as intelligence officers, chemical officers,
logistics officers, MPs, and signal officers—they will be
in the heat of battle. Even rear areas will not be safe.
In the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s SCUD missiles struck
American bases as far back as Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and
Israel. In a fight to the death, Saddam may unleash his
entire arsenal upon soft American targets—possibly with
chemical warheads.
No one is quite sure how Americans will respond if significant
numbers of women are killed in Iraq. “The real issue is,
if greater numbers of women get captured, how will the country
react?” asks Donnelly. “We would have to desensitize the
entire nation to violence against women. Endorsement of
women in combat means an endorsement of violence against
women at the hands of the enemy.” Perhaps. But even when
women have died in combat, the public hasn’t questioned
their reasons for being there. The nature of public grief
for soldiers like Marine Corps Sgt. Jeannette L. Winters,
a radio operator who was the first female military casualty
in the war against Afghanistan, may indicate that Americans
will accept female casualties if they believe in the cause
they’re fighting for.
In the end, what will really determine public reaction is
how well women perform their jobs under fire. On the ground
in Afghanistan, women did not participate in the main actions
of Operation Anaconda. But since the fighting died down,
female MPs have gone out on long infantry patrols with the
82nd Airborne Division, and by most indications performed
well. To be fair, they have not seen combat, and haven’t
performed the most physically demanding tasks the military
has to offer. But women have covered 10 to 20 miles of very
hard country per day carrying loads of up to 75 pounds,
all while living in close quarters with male infantry.
And so far, as in the Gulf, the worst predictions have not
come true—no reports of mass pregnancies or other issues
have come to light in Afghanistan. “I’m learning what grunts
do, [and] they learn what I do. As MPs, we search people
and look for weapons. . . . I never thought we would be
walking for hours or be on the front,” MP Sgt. Nicola Hall
told a reporter in Afghanistan after the mission. “[The
82nd Airborne soldiers] have been nothing but respectful
to us; as long as you walk, carry your own weight and don’t
whine, you’re respected.”
Indeed, if mixed-gender units perform as they have in the
California desert—and in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan—it would strengthen the integrationist trend
in several ways. The least likely possibility would be the
elimination of all rules barring women from full combat
service, from Special Forces to light infantry. But even
if this were to happen, surveys suggest that only a small
number of women would apply. And only a fraction of those
who do would have the physical ability and fortitude to
make it through, say, the crucible of Army ranger school,
from which a majority of qualified men wash out before graduation.
The second, and more likely, possibility is that certain
combat jobs currently off-limits to women would be opened.
For instance, women can currently serve in Patriot air-defense
units, but not in short-range air-defense or offensive artillery
units closer to the front—even though the skill levels are
virtually the same. Female soldiers frequently win the Army’s
highest awards for marksmanship and even participate on
the U.S. Olympic marksmanship team—but outside the MPs cannot
be snipers. If Saddam’s Baathist regime falls to U.S. forces
that include women, these kinds of job limitations may collapse,
too.
Finally, a successful showing by female soldiers is sure
to increase pressure on the Army to end the subtle day-to-day
discrimination that remains a fact of life for so many female
soldiers, from anachronistic “wives clubs” in some units
to assignment policies that place a premium on female soldiers
willing to defer childbearing indefinitely.
Even if more opportunities for women open up, the changes
are unlikely to be as radical or disruptive as many imagine,
for a simple reason: Not that many women are likely to take
advantage of the opportunities. A recent RAND Corporation
study indicates that women have not flooded into every new
specialty opened to them during the 1990s. Some, such as
Army bridge crewmembers, have seen an increase. But the
number of, say, female Marine Corps F-18 pilots has not
really changed. This is true in part because the services
still make it difficult for women to enter these occupations
by setting quotas that limit their number. But it is also
because of a lack of interest. According to a RAND survey,
while more than 75 percent of military women supported the
general idea of women in combat, only 10 to 15 percent of
those said they would actually pursue such jobs if given
the option.
“Enlisted
women are much less keen on rushing off to combat than female
officers,” observes Northwestern’s Moskos. In other words,
even in the event that the Army opens combat jobs to women,
those opposed to the idea may not have much to worry about.
And besides, the more women like Capt. Streigel who serve
bravely and effectively in an upcoming Iraq war, the more
female generals we’ll see a few years down the road—and
the more likely the issue of women’s role in the military
will work itself out.
Phillip
Carter served four years of active duty as a military police
officer; he now commands an infantry company in the reserves
and attends law school at UCLA. This story first appeared
in Washington
Monthly.